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Abstract: In the recent last decade, politicians, economists, media, are frequently discussing about 
Euro area survival, macroeconomic convergence or divergence, stabilization policies, economic cycles, 
fiscal space, austerity, debt consolidation, fiscal crisis, structural reforms etc. But these debates did not 
stop the sovereign debt defaults neither the escalating growth of private debt in the world and in 
European Monetary Union countries. The literature points out that some of the main causes of European 
sovereign debt crisis are  pre and post financial crisis events, the real estate market bubbles and poor 
public policies in some European Union countries. The specialists are still unable to fully understand 
and predict sovereign debt crises and the implications of debt accumulation in private sector. Thus, 
beyond a historical incursion based on some case studies, the present article intends to draw a series of 
lessons detached from the analysis of the European debt crisis, trying to clarify what is the basis of a 
contagion trend at Euro area level regarding indebtness, what is the connection between public and 
private debt and what can be done regarding the indebtness macroeconomic policy in order to ensure a 
smooth passage along the economic cycle. 
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1. Introduction 
Usually, the inability of a country to pay its public debt, in the context of high public 
debt levels and major economic and financial issues describe a sovereign debt crisis. 
According to Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) a debt crisis of a 
country is described by the fact that that country is in default by Standard & Poor’s 
criteria (e.g. on due date, a government miscarries to meet the principal or interest 
payment on external obligation - debt equity swaps, exchange offers or buy back for 
cash) or if it receives a large non-concessional loan from International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF) (e.g. access in excess of 100 percent of quota). By this definition the 
debt crisis encompasses not only the actual defaults on debt but also the inchoative 
defaults avoided only through massive financial support from International 
Monetary Fund. According to this definition the period of debt crisis can be quite 
extensive.  
Historically, the sovereign debt crisis started in 2009, with increasing government 
debt, with the failure of financial institutions and with high government securities 
bond yield spreads. The countries affected were Portugal, Cyprus, Greece, Spain and 
Ireland and in order to gain bailout funds they had to accomplish a series of measures 
hard to fulfill regarding the reduction of debt in public sector.  
In 2009, violating European Union (EU) policy, Greece government embellished 
budget deficit and when it was exposed, it caused fear of a contagion effect and the 
collapse of the euro currency in all Euro area countries. The Greece high budgetary 
deficit levels has worsened the investors’ confidence and increased out of proportion 
bond spreads. Thus, countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland have been rated 
by international rating agencies as having a sovereign debt classified as junk. 
Against the backdrop of fears about the alarming rise of sovereign debt, in 2010 a 
large proportion of international lenders have demanded higher interest rates for 
Euro zone countries which registered large debts and budget deficits. On the grounds 
of modest economic growth and unfavorable domestic and external circumstances, 
most Euro zone countries have cut public spending and increased taxes, thus 
worsening the population income and implicitly the population’s confidence in their 
political leaders, in fact aggravating the fall of the economic cycle. The European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created in 2010 in order to ameliorate the 
debt crisis, but its positive effects are still far from obvious. According to the Kehoe, 
Arellano and Conesa (2012), the capital guarantees of European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) initially was €440 bn. and in order to buy Greek, Portuguese and 
Irish bonds European Central Bank (ECB) launched Securities Market Program 
(SMP). 
In Greece case, taking into consideration the high yield divergence and the need for 
EU and IMF financial assistance, the imposed austerity measures have made more 
than just widening the recession to the point of generating a sovereign default in June 
2015. Also, considering the small GDP growth rate and high unemployment, the 
discussion was made in the direction of a possible departure of Greece from the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and even EU.  
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In November 2010, Ireland requested bailout and in May 2011, Portugal. Cyprus and 
Spain in June 2012 have requesting EU official assistance and Italy have requiring 
help on the ground of emerging banking crisis. However, until 2014, based on a 
series of fiscal reforms, internal economic aspects and some austerity measures have 
generated a substantial amelioration of the economic and fiscal status of Spain, 
Ireland and Portugal, making thus the call to European rescue package less 
important.  
According to the Kehoe, Arellano and Conesa (2012), in April 2012, of the 17 
members of the Euro zone, only four (Finland, Luxembourg, Germany and the 
Netherlands) had long-term government bonds with the highest Standard & Poor’s 
rating, while the bonds of other five countries (Cyprus, Italy, Ireland, Spain and 
Portugal) had junk ratings and in July 2011 Greek bonds were given the lowest 
possible rating, CCC.   
Debt crisis has affected also the Euro skeptics countries like United Kingdom, which 
took the decision of leaving EU in June 2016 based on a referendum. The exchange 
rate of the sterling pound in relation to the US dollar was collapsing and the negative 
yields on British government bonds have led some investors to leave British territory 
to safer areas for business, savings and investments. Even now, the full effects of 
Brexit are unknown, leaving unleashed the legal procedures of departure from 
European Union. 
Against the background of Brexit, has been put also the problem of the Italian 
banking crisis, Italy having a banking system that has accumulated an impressive 
level of non-viable loans. Of course, Italy's economy is much larger than that of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, and the need to rescue Italy can make the economic 
evolution of countries in the Euro zone extremely difficult. This is due to the fact 
that European Union has recently taken “bail-in” measures, which hinders the rescue 
of financial institutions with taxpayers' money, investors being those who have to 
cover first the losses. Considering crisis-resolution tools, the subject still cause 
debates on bail-ins versus bail-outs measures and the proper moment when the 
financial assistance should be provided by the European Commission and IMF.  
Thus, note mentioning that not just public debt creates serious issues of debt 
sustainability; part of the debt crisis is due to the rise in private debt, which also can 
create insolvency situations. Therefore, the article attempts to clarify the link 
between the two types of indebtedness as well as other macroeconomic indicators 
that can provide serious clues regarding the unfavorable evolution of the public debt 
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in Euro area. 
 
2. Description of the Problem in the Context of Literature Overview 
The literature considers as main causes of the sovereign debt crisis the poor fiscal-
budgetary policy with high expenses and weak revenues, the real estate bubbles and 
the financial crisis and Great Recession effects (which extended until 2012).  
Acording to Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003), sovereign debt crises 
have more persistence than currency crisis and when a country gets itself in a default 
situation, the macroeconomic framework is far from positive. Also, they mention 
that one of the sources of debt-servicing difficulties in debt crisis is the short 
maturities of external or domestic debt obligations of the private sector or of the 
sovereign state. 
The literature on debt crisis is either base on theoretical approaches or empirical 
papers on determinants of spreads or of debt crisis (empirical studies focusing on 
only part of the determinants or specific episodes of the debt crisis and are close to 
an early-warning signal model using mostly probit or logit regressions). The 
exchange rate evolution and the exchange rate regime can accentuate or diminish the 
debt (especially if the debt is mostly in foreign exchange!) accumulation and the 
solvency of a country is related to the ability to pay back the debt (thus the stock of 
debt can be reported on revenues, GDP or exports). The liquidity is also important, 
many debt crisis are based rather on illiquidity than insolvability. Thus, in order to 
capture some aspects of illiquidity it is important to report the evolution of short-
term debt to net international reserves or to net exports.  
If we take into account the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, which invokes the 
population's inclination towards possible savings to pay future increases of taxes as 
a result of the increase in public debt, when are found high levels of total public debt, 
also private savings are assumed to be high (net financial assets of the population are 
considered high). This hypothesis is partially verified in this article by associating 
public debt (but not only!) with total financial assets consolidated (in millions of 
euro). 
Also, the macroeconomic stability of a country, reflected by indicators such as 
temperate money growth or low inflation, sound public and institutional policies, the 
decrease of unemployment rate and the improved situation of government 
deficit/surplus may reflect the predictability and the credibility of the public policies 
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and may mould the attitude of investors towards that particular country and to 
moderate the evolution of public indebtedness. Thus, in studies of Haque, Nelson, 
and Mathieson (1998) and Lee (1993) the debt crisis were correlated with default 
history, with external debt and other political and macroeconomic explanatory 
variables. Using macroeconomic data, many of the studies are purely econometric 
and they still have rather relative or limited capacity to explain and predict sovereign 
debt crisis.  
Thus, the present article tries to identify some macroeconomic variables that can 
explain the indebtness phenomenon in some Euro area countries and the link 
between public and private debt. 
 
3. Methodology and Data Sources 
The article is intended to analyze the indebtness phenomenon base on the case 
studies of Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, looking also to United 
Kingdom (for Brexit turbulence), and having as referential for “normality” the 
German case. The data are collected from Eurostat, and for the debt crisis relevance 
are systematized in charts for the 2006 (before the global financial crisis) - 2017 
period, reflecting the situation since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, thus 
including the European sovereign debt crisis.  
For the connection with important macroeconomic variables of general government 
gross debt, it has been used a simple econometric correlation matrix for the above 
mentioned countries for the period 1995 - 2017. The variables used for econometric 
correlation are General government gross debt (EDP concept), consolidated, annual 
data, noted GGGD (%GDP); GDP and main components (output, expenditure and 
income) noted GDP (crt. prices, mil. Euro); Private sector debt: loans, by sectors, of 
non-financial corporations, consolidated expressed as % of GDP noted PSDL (% 
GDP); Financial balance sheets reflected by total financial assets on total economy 
noted TEFA(%GDP); HICP - inflation rate, annual average rate of change (%) with 
referential  the year 2015 noted HICP (2015 = 100); Government deficit/surplus, 
debt and associated data noted GD/S(%GDP); Unemployment by sex and age, 
annual average, percentage of active population noted Un(%AP). For simplification 
the correlation matrices for each country are reduced only to the connection of 
General government gross debt (%GDP) with the above mentioned independent 
variables.  
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The availability of the data was rather scarce taking into account that the frequency 
of the data was annual, imposed by the Eurostat systematization of the 
macroeconomic indicators. Consequently, the conclusions drawn may indicate some 
methodological reserves required by the lack of some data and limited available set 
of data (only twenty-three records).  With all the reservations expressed, the results 
of correlation matrices for each of the countries summarized in a single correlation 
matrix to explain public indebtedness reflect a series of interesting information that 
it will be presented to the results section. 
 
4. Results Obtained 
First of all we might say that the countries in this situation of a debt crisis are not 
wasteful but rather dragged in the vicious circle of improper correlation between 
income and spending. In an economic boom, increased tax revenues on the grounds 
of high consumption and increased asset transactions are quite normal, thus the 
governments might make projects for decreasing taxes of future spending. For 
examples, at the beginning of the year 2007, Euro area countries seemed to be doing 
pretty well, having small inflation and positive economic growth, despite high public 
debt. But when the fall of the economic cycle begins, governments are not so well 
prepared to combat high deficits and usually seek to borrow more from international 
capital markets to mitigate internal imbalances. Moreover, many investors receive 
the potential dangers of public over- indebtness and /or private indebtness (like large 
and important financial institutions or commercial banks) and are looking for new 
areas for positioning their investments. Therefore, private entities “wash” some of 
their debt by transferring their liability to the state, and the private and public 
boundary becomes almost insensible (as for example, in the relatively recent credit 
crunch). However, private earnings are not as well distributed to society as in a crisis 
case, when the state intervenes to save private financial institutions. Still, an 
argument is in favor of the banks, in the sense that they hold many government titles, 
especially sovereign bonds and by the collapse of trust in the government, the banks 
also are receiving higher cost of borrowing money from the capital markets. At the 
same time, because of these higher risks, banks in turn lend less the private sector 
and the population, transferring the problem of liquidity or solvency crisis from the 
nominal economy to the real economy. In order to regain credibility in the face of 
investors, governments undertake structural reforms and fiscal consolidation 
measures, borrowing also from international financial institutions (especially IMF, 
European Commission, World Bank etc.). But negative effects of a debt crisis are 
seen mostly by the population and companies, by restricting public investment, 
consumption and domestic production. Thus, the problem of galloping 
unemployment intervenes and the economic growth is starting to strongly fluctuate. 
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This is the case of Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal caught in 
sovereign debt crisis (see Figure 1). 
  
Figure 1. Real GDP growth rate (percentage change on previous year) and 
unemployment (percentage of active population) of Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and United Kingdom 
Source: Eurostat data, author’s prelucration  
The debt crisis determined (as in the Greece, Spain and Ireland case) to implement 
many cuttings of government spending but the result was the decrease of tax 
revenues, a decline in growth rate of the economy and the increase of debt to GDP. 
Also, the investors had an adverse behavior towards risk regarding holding debt in 
several countries of Euro area, increasing risk of liquidity shortage and pushing up 
interest rates of bond markets, making serious difficulties in financing deficits. 
Lacking growth but also employment policies, fiscal transfer policies and demand 
policies, Portugal, Italy, Spain and U.K. have entered into a double dip recession 
(depressed economy with large public spending cuts) in 2012. Because the countries 
of Euro area cannot devalue their currency (Euro) and loose up monetary policy (the 
so called Euro “straight jacket”), they are quite restricted in the capacity of reducing 
their public budget deficit. However, some progress has been made in the last few 
years in all countries considered in this article, except Portugal (see Figure 2). On 
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the basis of financial assistance and fiscal consolidation, the Greece and Cyprus case 
can show us that they can have even moderate surpluses. 
  
Figure 2. Government deficit/surplus (% of GDP) and total economy financial assets 
(% of GDP) of Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and United 
Kingdom 
Source: Eurostat data, author’s prelucration  
But structural issues are still standing strong. For example, the Ireland government 
had to take the commercial bank losses becoming overly indebted,  Italy has 
surpluses on primary budget but important ageing population problem (thus big 
pressure on pension system, on wage costs  and on tax system) and Greece has 
serious issues in attracting funding and has still very high levels of public debt (see 
Figure 2). 
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Figure 3. General government gross debt (% of GDP) and private sector debt – loans 
(% of GDP) of Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and United 
Kingdom 
Source: Eurostat data, author’s prelucration 
In order cu cover up the public debt problem, indebted governments were determined 
to sell more and more government bonds, leading thus to higher bond yields, but 
having no national central bank to buy government bonds, in order to keep low the 
government bond rates and to restore the positive feeling of the market, the liquidity 
crisis became a real crisis. Thus, internal devaluation, investment crowding out 
effect, bond yields rising, increasing wage costs, lack of independence of monetary 
policy and lack of fiscal transfers might lead also in the future to higher public sector 
debt.  
In the analyzed countries, the high general government gross debt is also 
accompanied by the increase in private debt (remarked especially after the year 
2007), being quite explosive for Ireland and Cyprus even now, but decreasing for all 
the other countries since 2011-2012 (see Figure 3). At the same time, considering the 
Ricardian equivalence we can notice, analyzing the Figures 2 and 3, that with the 
increase of public debt also the total financial assets on the economy (% of GDP) 
increased mildly in the 2008-2011/2012, but with an explosion of total financial 
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assets on the economy for Ireland and Cyprus, similar rather with the situation of 
private sector debt for this two countries. For Ireland and Cyprus, this suggests the 
existence of an overwhelmingly large portfolio of non-viable/speculative financial 
assets, with their financial assets well above the levels of countries like Germany 
and the UK which have well-developed money and capital markets. 
For the all analyzed countries, for the 1995-2017 period, if we look at a combined 
and simplified correlation matrix of General government gross debt (% GDP) with 
GDP, with Private sector debt, with Total financial assets, with HICP, with 
Government deficit/surplus and with Unemployment as rate of active population, 
and if we consider only the very strong correlation we might have some important 
conclusions (see Table 1).  
Table 2. Simplified and combined correlation matrix of General government gross 
debt with other macroeconomic variables for the Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and United Kingdom 
  
German
y Ireland Greece Spain Italy Cyprus Portugal 
United 
Kingdo
m 
  
GGGD 
(%GDP) 
GGGD 
(%GDP
) 
GGGD 
(%GDP
) 
GGGD 
(%GDP
) 
GGGD 
(%GDP
) 
GGGD 
(%GDP
) 
GGGD 
(%GDP
) 
GGGD 
(%GDP) 
GDP 
(crt.prices, 
mil. Euro) 0.67 0.17 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.52 0.72 0.56 
PSDL (% 
GDP) -0.61 0.65 0.90 0.01 0.30 0.10 0.62 0.31 
GD/S(%GDP) 0.37 -0.51 0.16 -0.50 0.01 -0.10 -0.18 -0.57 
TEFA(%GDP
) 0.69 0.82 0.93 0.39 0.53 0.68 0.70 0.75 
HICP (2015 = 
100) 0.79 0.31 0.84 0.52 0.60 0.72 0.88 0.94 
Un(%AP) -0.53 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.79 0.95 0.88 0.26 
Source: Eurostat data, author’s calculation. Notations: GGGD (%GDP) - General government 
gross debt (EDP concept), consolidated, annual data, noted; GDP (crt.prices, mil. Euro) - GDP 
and main components (output, expenditure and income); PSDL (% GDP) - Private sector debt: 
loans, by sectors, of non-financial corporations, consolidated expressed as % of GDP; 
GD/S(%GDP) - Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data; TEFA(%GDP) - Total 
financial assets on total economy; HICP (2015 = 100) - HICP - inflation rate, annual average 
rate of change (%) with 2015 referential year; Un(%AP) - Unemployment by sex and age, 
annual average, percentage of active population. Color code: very light gray - interval [0.75; 1]; 
light gray - interval [0.50; 0.75); gray - range [0.25; 0.50); dark gray - interval [0; 0.25). 
Thus, General government gross debt (% GDP) is positively and strongly correlated: 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol 14, no 7, 2018 
98 
for Germany with HICP, for Ireland with TEFA (%GDP) and Un (%AP), for Greece 
with PSDL (% GDP), TEFA(%GDP), HICP and Un(%AP), for Spain with 
Un(%AP), for Italy with Un(%AP), for Cyprus with Un(%AP), for Portugal with 
HICP and Un(%AP) and for United Kingdom with TEFA(%GDP) and HICP.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The sovereign debt crisis has been an important moment in the history of recent 
crises, highlighting the growing need to analyze and understand the source of the 
debts and to seek solutions to their resolution. Thus, the article aims at analyzing the 
indebtness phenomenon between 20076-2017 period base on the case studies of 
Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, looking also to United Kingdom 
(for Brexit turbulence), and having the German case as referential for “normality”.  
Although the budget deficit, as a percentage of GDP, has improved visibly for almost 
all countries under review and economic growth shows signs of improvement, also 
inflation shows growth trends, unemployment remains extremely high and public 
debt and private debt (in countries like Ireland and Cyprus) are still having difficult 
levels to be mastered. In all analyzed countries, the debt crisis has imposed the 
implementation of many cuttings of government spending but the result was the 
decrease of tax revenues, a decline in growth rate of the economy and the increase 
of debt to GDP. This aspect has created a kind of negative spiral of indebtedness, to 
which are adding problems like internal devaluation, investment crowding out, bond 
yields rising, increasing wage costs, lack of independence of monetary policy and 
lack of fiscal transfers. For the highly indebted Euro area countries, the exit form 
EMU is not a solution, being hard to be done and counterproductive and in the case 
of defaulting, this situation will impose serious difficulties in borrowing from capital 
markets, thus limiting the possibility of economic recovery and debt repayment. 
For the analyzed countries, for the period 1995 – 2017, if we look at the connection 
of general government gross debt with important macroeconomic variables, using a 
combined and simplified econometric correlation matrix and if we consider only the 
very strong correlations, we might have some important conclusions. Thus, General 
government gross debt (% GDP) is positively and strongly correlated: for Germany 
with inflation, for Ireland with total financial assets on total economy (%GDP) and 
with unemployment  (percentage of active population), for Greece with private 
sector debt: loans, by sectors, of non-financial corporations, consolidated expressed 
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as % of GDP, with total financial assets on total economy (%GDP), with inflation 
and unemployment  (percentage of active population), for Spain with unemployment  
(percentage of active population), for Italy with unemployment  (percentage of active 
population), for Cyprus with unemployment  (percentage of active population), for 
Portugal with inflation and unemployment  (percentage of active population) and for 
United Kingdom with total financial assets on total economy (%GDP) and inflation.  
Thus, we can observe that at the level of all the analyzed countries, inflation or 
unemployment or both have an important say in relation to public indebtedness. 
Financial assets and private indebtedness may also be considered as elements that 
may partially explain the evolution of public indebtedness for some of the analyzed 
countries. Against the backdrop of tough austerity measures and fiscal consolidation, 
the evolution of the budget deficit (expressed as a percentage of GDP) has a reversed 
and not very strong link with the evolution of public indebtedness (expressed as a 
percentage of GDP) in all the countries under analysis. The conclusions drawn may 
indicate some methodological reserves imposed by the lack of some data and limited 
available set of data (only twenty-three records).   
Beyond the econometric analysis, we can uncover the idea that the sovereign debt 
crisis is heavily focused not only on the individual realities of each country, but also 
on the strong economic ties between countries and, implicitly, on the contagion 
effects. Therefore, common measures are needed in most of the countries under 
review, and the strong benchmark on the euro, based on the German currency, may 
be too tough to allow long-term positive economic developments for all other 
countries except Germany.  Thus, one solution for debt crisis might be the increasing 
of the capacity of EU, Commission and ECB for helping EMU countries to repay 
debt, giving more monetary stimulus to overcome the problem of incapacity of 
devaluating their currency and sustaining more the economic growth of over-
indebted countries, by better balancing fiscal consolidation measures with measures 
of satisfying social and economic needs of EMU countries.  
Therefore, the sovereign debt crisis has highlighted the need to expand the toolbox 
to regulate macroeconomic imbalances, both at the EU and euro area levels, and at 
individual level, of each national state. 
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6. Future Directions to Be Approached 
The article may cause important theoretical and practical openings by looking for 
elements which might better explain how national debt accumulation is developing, 
the causes of contagion effect among countries regarding the debt issue and which 
would be the most appropriate solutions for reducing public indebtedness in the 
context of EU budget constraints. At the same time, for non-euro area countries, 
given the multiple rigidities and constraints of European Monetary Union, it should 
be analyzed what is the optimal structure of public indebtedness and what is its 
reasonable minimum threshold for a good entry in the euro area and for a proper 
management of public debt in euro area. 
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